The whole science is not the only way of knowing gambit is something that has bugged me for ages. I've even had it pulled on me before, it seems to be related to the ye olde science doesn't know everything and it's all just a theory gambits that are often used in an attempt to knock science. I find it pleasing therefore to see that a few deconstruction of it have started appearing in the blogosphere.
The best one so far I found is by Russel Blackford at metamagician. The core of the argument is that it is a straw man. There are a variety of tools that people use. Specialized tasks require specialized tools. This is what scientists have, an assortment of methods that are used to figure out what is going in the world around us. Then again, it is also what historians have, a different set of tools, but a set of tools none the less, which are designed for figuring out something about the world.
So there is no problem when science readily admits that its not the only way of knowing things. Pretty much any scientist will admit this, it's only people who are trying to discredit science (usually when a study comes out that completely debunks whatever it is they are doing) who raise this objection. Science is one of the ways of knowing things which falls under the heading of rational discourse. Historians have valid ways of finding out things about history after all. The point that most who advance this argument miss though, is that Just because there is more than one way of knowing things, does not mean that all potential ways of knowing things are. Knowledge gained by revelation is not knowledge. There is nothing to back it up. Whereas the historian will be able to point to the structure of their body of knowledge, demonstrate how their view was arrived at and provide evidence. The can only say "God says so". Halfway between the two (or probably, mostly towards the divine revelation side of the equation) is homeopathy, which can only point to a completely implausible (i.e not rational) and discredited body of work to justify their supposed knowledge.
This definitely goes in the category of responses that I have to remember.
The best one so far I found is by Russel Blackford at metamagician. The core of the argument is that it is a straw man. There are a variety of tools that people use. Specialized tasks require specialized tools. This is what scientists have, an assortment of methods that are used to figure out what is going in the world around us. Then again, it is also what historians have, a different set of tools, but a set of tools none the less, which are designed for figuring out something about the world.
So there is no problem when science readily admits that its not the only way of knowing things. Pretty much any scientist will admit this, it's only people who are trying to discredit science (usually when a study comes out that completely debunks whatever it is they are doing) who raise this objection. Science is one of the ways of knowing things which falls under the heading of rational discourse. Historians have valid ways of finding out things about history after all. The point that most who advance this argument miss though, is that Just because there is more than one way of knowing things, does not mean that all potential ways of knowing things are. Knowledge gained by revelation is not knowledge. There is nothing to back it up. Whereas the historian will be able to point to the structure of their body of knowledge, demonstrate how their view was arrived at and provide evidence. The can only say "God says so". Halfway between the two (or probably, mostly towards the divine revelation side of the equation) is homeopathy, which can only point to a completely implausible (i.e not rational) and discredited body of work to justify their supposed knowledge.
This definitely goes in the category of responses that I have to remember.